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Abstract 
Uncertainties and risks in the decision making process are abundant in the area of 
environmental economics, irrespective of whether the problems being discussed are local or 
global. This paper uses laboratory evidence from public goods games to examine how in 
payoff equivalent situations, decision makers contribute towards local or global 
environmental goods, in the presence of risk and uncertainties in the provision of these goods. 
We use a within subject design that allows for comparisons across seven different treatments 
in which subjects are exposed to internal (strategic) and external (environmental) risk and 
uncertainty. Our results show that the location of the risk and uncertainty matters, with 
subjects moving away from the external uncertainty in favor of internal uncertainty, when 
that uncertainty is associated with the local environmental good. When the uncertainty relates 
to the global environmental good, subjects face both external and internal uncertainty on the 
same good leading to a significant drop in contributions. We find that in the presence of risk 
and uncertainty subjects use feedback from other members of their group when deciding 
about future contributions. The reward for research and development and innovation is 
captured in the experimental design by the increased probability of obtaining the desired 
outcome in the endogenous probability treatment. Subjects seem to understand this incentive 
and contribute more towards global goods in this treatment.  
JEL classification: C91, Q00, H41. 
Keywords:  Experiments, Public Goods, Local and Global Environmental Problems, Risk, 
Uncertainty. 
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1.  Introduction 
All environmental problems, whether global or local, commonly involve scientific and 
economic uncertainties. In addition, the process of environmental policy making involves 
further uncertainties regarding the decisions and actions taken by the parties involved. In this 
paper we explore, using laboratory experiments, how the two kinds of uncertainties influence 
decisions in the context of global and local environmental problems. 
Since Knight (1921) introduced the dichotomy of known and unknown probabilities, 
the economics literature applies the term “uncertainty” to describe situations when the 
probabilities of possible future events are unknown. The term “risk” is used to describe 
situations when the probabilities of future events are known.  
Climate change is a classic example of global environmental problems. While there is 
scientific evidence that atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases are increasing as a 
result of human activities, the resulting changes in world climates and the costs and benefits 
of proposed strategies for responding to possible global warming are not at all certain. 
Another well known global environmental problem is the depletion of the ozone layer caused 
by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). The two global environmental problems, however, differ in 
the degree of knowledge about the environmental uncertainties. While climate change is 
undoubtedly a case of “uncertainty” since no precise probability estimates exist, the ozone 
layer depletion is more characterized as “risk” since detailed scientific knowledge and 
predictions exist about the impact of the depletion of the ozone layer and its impact on human 
health (eg. melanoma, cataracts). 
Examples of local environmental risks and uncertainties are also abundant. Kerr 
(1992) gives an example of geysers in northern California which are used for their 
geothermal power. From the beginning of their use in the 1960s, great uncertainties 
surrounded the underground structure and the availability of the feeding groundwater.  3
Decisions made in uncertainty lead to exploitation beyond safe yield and the destruction of 
the resource. Another example of local environmental problems is the impact of different 
timber management regimes on the survival of the Leadbeater’s possum, found in the wet 
mountain eucalypt forests of the central highlands of Victoria in Australia, Wills (1997). 
There is no experience and no reliable estimates about the depletion of geysers thus decision 
makers are facing “uncertainty”. There is, however, some experience with timber 
management and its impact on habitat and the survival probabilities of forest-dependent 
species. Thus decision makers in the second case are facing “risk”. 
In the context of all these examples, research may be viewed as a means of decreasing 
the uncertainty by improving the reliability of estimates and, therefore, converting uncertain 
decision situations into risky situations. Furthermore, adaptation strategies may be viewed as 
ones that increase (decrease) the probability of occurrence of the desirable (undesirable) 
outcome. 
Environmental problems have often been modelled in a laboratory using the 
framework of public goods and common pool resource dilemma games. In the standard non-
cooperative experimental setting there is always uncertainty about the ultimate size of the 
public good or resource request as subjects do not know how other group members will 
behave. Messick et al. (1988) refers to this uncertainty as “strategic uncertainty”. The role of 
strategic uncertainty has been extensively modelled in the laboratory. Several factors 
including group size (Buchanan, 1968; Marwell and Ames, 1979; Isaac and Walker, 1988; 
Isaac et al., 1990 and Loehman et al., 1996), the information structure inherent in the 
experimental design (Budescu et al., 1995a; Suleiman et al., 1996), the incentives or 
contribution mechanism employed (Green and Laffont, 1979; Groves and Ledyard, 1977, 
1980 and Loehman et al., 1996), existence and the level of provision point (Schelling, 1960; 
Schmidtz, 1987; Isaac et al., 1989 and Marks and Croson, 1998), incentives for the public  4
good relative to the private good (Isaac et al., 1984; Isaac and Walker, 1988 and Zelmer, 
2003) have been shown to have significant impact on the contribution levels.
1  
An implicit assumption underlying these public goods and common pool resource 
dilemma games is that the optimal size of the public good or the carrying capacity of the 
commons is known and that there is no uncertainty associated with the benefits of the public 
or private goods. However, in many environmental problems that bear a resemblance to the 
public good games, such as climate change, the decision makers do not know with certainty 
the optimal level of carbon-dioxide emissions abatement, nor the costs and benefits of 
proposed mitigation strategies. Similarly, in many environmental problems that share the 
destructive characteristics of the common pool resource dilemmas (e.g., energy shortage, 
deforestation, over-fishing) the carrying capacity of the resource is not known with certainty. 
Messick et al. (1988) introduced the terminology “environmental uncertainty” to distinguish 
this factor from strategic uncertainty: “Environmental uncertainty refers to environmental 
variables that determine which group action is best, while [strategic] uncertainty centres on 
how other group members will respond….The problem that is raised by the environmental 
uncertainty is the problem of optimality or efficiency, while the problem raised by [strategic] 
uncertainty is (…) coordination.” (Messick et al. 1988; p. 678-679). Messick et al. (1988) 
incorporated a probabilistic destruction of the resource when the safe yield was surpassed and 
showed that even when strategic uncertainty was absent (i.e., there was only one participant) 
the random size of the resource led to sub-optimal outcome. 
Several researchers have used mean preserving spreads to model uncertainty. 
Rapoport et al. (1992) used uniform distributions of resource with the same expected value 
(mean) but different levels of variances (ranges) representing increasing environmental 
                                                      
1 For a survey about treatment variables that have been shown to affect contribution levels in public 
goods games, see Ledyard (1995) and for a meta-analysis of several of these factors see Zelmer (2003). 
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uncertainty. In the five-person group experiment it appeared that subjects dealt with the 
strategic uncertainty by requesting roughly one-fifth of the mean amount available. As the 
environmental uncertainty (range) increased, however, subjects requested more than an equal 
share from the resource. Associated with the observed over-exploitation of the common 
resources, subjects' estimates of the resource size also increased. Similarly, Suleiman et al. 
(1996) also found that the subjects’ mean estimates of the random resource size increased as 
the resource uncertainty increased. One of the explanations provided by Rapoport et al. 
(1992) is that when people are asked to provide their best estimate of an unknown resource, 
their estimate will be biased by what they hope for. Such a tendency has been labeled in the 
literature “optimism”, “outcome desirability bias”, or simply “wishful thinking” (Hogarth, 
1987). 
Wit and Wilke (1998) manipulate strategic uncertainty by giving bogus feedback 
about the variance of the contribution levels of the fellow subjects. Low and high variance of 
contribution levels represented low and high strategic uncertainty, respectively. The authors 
found lower actual contributions under high environmental uncertainty than under low 
environmental uncertainty with the most dramatic drop in the contribution levels when high 
environmental uncertainty was coupled with high strategic uncertainty.  
In the public goods domain, Dickinson (1998) found that when the provision of the 
public good was conditional on the aggregate contribution level (Incentives treatment) the 
increase in probability of provision as a function of contribution levels did not significantly 
affect contribution levels but the changing marginal incentives did. 
Loewenstein et al. (1989) found evidence that people’s attitudes towards risk and the 
decision process involving risk and uncertainty may be very different in social and nonsocial 
domains owing to the differences between social and nonsocial preferences. This provides  6
further validity for our research and for our interest in the distinction between social or 
“strategic” and nonsocial or “environmental” uncertainty.
2  
The main focus of the current research is to investigate how individuals perceive risks 
and uncertainties when making decisions about local and global environmental policies. 
Using the framework of public goods games we study whether - in payoff equivalent 
situations - decision makers contribute more or less towards local or global environmental 
problems when different forms of risks and uncertainties regarding the decision outcome are 
involved. In this paper, money spent on private goods is interpreted as contributions to local 
environmental problems, while contributions to public goods are thought of as contributions 
towards global environmental problems. From the viewpoint of a single region, state or 
country, global problems involve strategic uncertainty, that is outcomes can depend on the 
strategies adopted by other countries. Hence a country’s individual effort to mitigate global 
environmental problems are comparable to voluntary contributions to provide a public good, 
while efforts to resolve local environmental problems are not complicated by the presence of 
strategic uncertainty, making it similar to a private good. 
While several papers have examined different aspects of risk and uncertainty in 
isolation, this paper attempts to employ three different kinds of treatments (Risk, Uncertainty 
and Incentives) in a common framework. Also, the above mentioned decision scenarios are 
placed into a standard public goods game context.  The treatments considered allow us to 
isolate strategic uncertainty from several forms of environmental risk and uncertainty using 
Bernoulli (Risk treatment), uniform (Uncertainty treatment) and endogenous probabilities 
(Incentives treatment). In the baseline treatment no environmental uncertainty exists, only 
strategic uncertainty influences the outcome. Throughout the rest of the treatments, strategic 
                                                      
2  For further discussion of the different kinds of environmental and strategic risk and uncertainty 
studied in the literature, in various experimental settings, refer to Nemes (2005). 
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uncertainty (e.g., group size, communication, marginal incentives to contribute) is kept 
constant and environmental risk and uncertainty is introduced in both local and global 
environmental problem settings. Implementing multiple-shot games and within-subject 
analysis allows us to combine these areas of research in a systematic and rigorous way and to 
gain further insights into several aspects of decision making in the field of environmental 
policy. 
As we explain our results in the context of environmental policy making, in order to 
avoid confusion, in this paper we use the term internal uncertainty to describe strategic 
uncertainty and the term external uncertainty to describe environmental uncertainty.
3 Internal 
uncertainty therefore describes the uncertain nature of the decision making process due to 
unknown information about the decision of others. External risk and uncertainty arises from 
the limited understanding (scientific and economic) of the environmental systems (whether 
probabilities are known or unknown). 
 
2.  Experimental Design 
2.1 Experimental  Procedure 
The laboratory experiment was implemented in ten sessions each involving five subjects and 
fifteen decision making periods for each of the seven treatments.
4 We used a within-subject 
design; all 50 subjects participated in the seven treatments, which allows for powerful 
comparisons across treatments. At the beginning of each experimental session participants 
were told that they would be participating in an economic experiment in which they would 
                                                      
3 Another way to look at the distinction between the environmental and strategic uncertainty is to note 
that while environmental uncertainty is exogenous to the decision maker, strategic uncertainty is endogenous. 
However, in some of the treatments in this paper, research influences environmental uncertainty and thus the 
decision to undertake research and development can make environmental uncertainty endogenous in those 
treatments. Hence we avoid using the terms exogenous and endogenous to indicate strategic and environmental 
uncertainty respectively and prefer internal and external uncertainty. External uncertainty in our paper includes 
treatments where the uncertainty is exogenous to the decision maker and some treatments where it is 
endogenous.  
4 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 1999).   8
make investment decisions.
5 A group of five participants faced the same investment dilemma 
and made simultaneous decisions.  
In order to control for risk aversion at the individual level, prior to the computerized 
experiment, we asked the subjects to participate in a hand run lottery game. Participants had 
to indicate their preferences between two options: a safe option that yielded $7.00 with 
certainty or a risky option. The risky option had a probability of winning $12 changing from 
10% in the first lottery to 100% in the 10
th lottery or correspondingly the probability of 
winning $2 changing from 90% in the first lottery to 0% in the 10
th lottery (similar to lottery 
games described in Brown and Stewart, 1999 and Holt and Laury, 2002). One of the games 
on the sheet was played at the end of each session. Conducting the lottery game helped in 
measuring the risk preference of the subjects which we can then compare with their 
behaviour in the public goods experiments where they face risk and uncertainty in the group 
context.
6 Furthermore, qualitative and quantitative information were also collected in the form 
of questionnaires from the participants. These questionnaires were completed by the 
participants after treatment 4 and 5 and also at the end of the session. (The instructions and 
questionnaires are in the Appendix.)  
The experiments were conducted using subjects drawn from a population of 
undergraduate and graduate students at The University of Melbourne. Subjects made an 
average of 33 cents per decision period and a total of $37 on average. Furthermore, subjects 
received an additional $2, $7 or $12, depending on their choice and the outcome of the lottery 
                                                      
5 In order to avoid framing bias in the decisions, the subjects were given instructions where a neutral 
language was used. Instead of making decisions about environmental problems, subjects were making 
investment decisions into a “private” and a “group” account.  Even the term “contribution” was avoided and the 
more neutral term “investment” was used instead. 
6 While the risk attitude survey was an important part of the current research and we use the risk 
estimates in the multivariate estimations presented in the results section, the results are discussed in further 
detail in Nemes (2005).  9
game. In order to control for wealth effects, their income from the lottery game was only 
revealed to the subjects at the end of the session, after the public goods experiment.  
2.2 Decision  Process 
At the start of each period, each subject was given the same number of tokens or 
experimental dollars (E$),  . i ω  The subjects had to divide these tokens between contributing 
to a “private account” ( i x ) and a “group account” ( i g ). Investment into the private account 
earned α  experimental dollars with probability  x p  to the individual only. Contributions to 
the group account earned 
n
G
β  experimental dollars to each participant with probability g p , 
where  ∑
=
=
n
i
g G
1
,  β  is the “efficiency factor” of the group account and n is the number of 
participants in the group. Contributions to the group account yielded the same return to all 
participants, irrespective of their contributions. Therefore, the group account exhibited the 
public goods’ non-excludible and non-rival characteristics. At the end of each period, 
subjects learnt the aggregate level of contribution to the public good and their return from the 
private as well as the group account.  
2.3  Formulation of the Social Dilemma 
Individual  i ’s expected payoff is given by 
n
G
p x p u E g i x i β α + = ) ( .  The subjects must 
maximize this payoff function, subject to a budget constraint ( i i i g x + = ω ), a public goods 
identity ( ∑
=
=
n
i
i g G
1
), and a non-negativity constraint ( 0 ≥ i g ).  
Let’s define M as the marginal per capita return (MPCR) – the amount that is 
generated for each member of the group when one individual contributes a token to the public 
good. It can also be seen as the marginal rate of substitution of the private good for the public  10
good or as a measure of the incentives to contribute to the public good.
7 EM is the expected 
value of the marginal per capita return. 
x
g
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i
p n
p
g u
G u
E M E EM
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/
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In the baseline treatment, where  1 = = g x p p ,  M EM = . The value of  α  and β  may 
change from one treatment to the other but remain constant throughout each treatment. 
The social dilemma arises if the parameters satisfy the inequality: 
g x
g p p
n
p
β α
β
< < < 0 
In this case, a unit investment into the private account provides a subject with more 
payoff than a unit investment into the group account. On the other hand, taking from every 
participant a unit of the private investment and contributing it to the group account makes 
each participant better off.  Thus, the unique dominant strategy is to free ride (i.e., zero 
contribution 0 = i g  for  i ∀ ) while the socially optimal Pareto efficient solution requires 
every participant to contribute all their tokens to the group account (i.e.,  i i g ω =  and  I gi ∈  
for  i ∀ ).  
2.4.    Treatments  
We examine 7 treatments in this paper. We controlled for order effects by switching the order 
in which subjects experienced the treatments.
8 Using the terminology introduced by Knight 
(1921), treatments 2 and 3 replicate decision making with risk (known probabilities) whereas 
treatments 6 and 7 present decision making with uncertainty (unknown probabilities). 
Furthermore, treatments 4 and 5 replicate a situation when initially decision makers face 
                                                      
7 The MPCR was introduced by Isaac et al (1984).  
8 The baseline treatment (treatment 1) was always conducted first and the risk, uncertainty and 
incentives treatment followed in the same order, The order of the treatments varied in the sense whether it was 
the private or the public good that had risks or uncertainties associated with it.   11
uncertainty but can learn the exact probabilities and thereby reduce uncertainty to risk 
(endogenous probabilities).  
2.4.1.  Baseline (Treatment 1) 
The baseline treatment (treatment 1) is a standard public goods game; there is no risk 
regarding return from the private or the group account.  All parameters, (α , β ,  x p  and  g p ) 
are known with certainty to the participants and  x p = g p =1,  5 . 1 , 1 = = β α . There is no 
external uncertainty and the only uncertainty that is present in the game is internal 
uncertainty, which is kept constant throughout the following treatments. The expected 
marginal per capita ratio is  3 . 0 = = M EM . The group payoff in case of Pareto efficient 
outcome would be 1.5 Experimental dollars for each group member for each period while the 
free riding Nash equilibrium would yield each subject 1 Experimental dollar per period. The 
parameters for  5 = n  and  100 = i ω  are summarized in Table 1.  
2.4.2.  Risk (Treatments 2 and 3) 
In the risk treatments, the probability of obtaining the return from the private account 
(treatment 2) or the group account (treatment 3) is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution, while 
keeping everything else constant (including the marginal incentives to contribute).   
Participants are no longer guaranteed the return from their investments. In treatment 2 the 
probability of return from the private account is reduced to  5 . 0 = x p  but it is held constant 
throughout the treatment and its value is known to all participants. For each period, the 
computer generated a random number,  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ r . If  x p r ≤  then the investment multiplied by 
the efficiency factor on the private account ( i x α ) was returned. Otherwise the investment into 
the private account was lost for the participants. The investment into the group account was 
returned with certainty  1 = g p  and the efficiency factor on the group account remained 
unchanged at  5 . 1 = β . Similarly, in treatment 3 the return from the group account is no  12
longer guaranteed but its probability is held constant and is known to all participants, 
5 . 0 = g p . In order to preserve the value of  3 . 0 = EM  and maintain the single-period 
dominant strategy of zero contributions and the Pareto efficient outcome at 100 percent 
contribution, the efficiency factor on the private and the group account was modified to 
2 = α and 3 = β in treatment 2 and 3, respectively. The parameters of the group account were 
held at the values of the baseline treatment,  1 = x p  and  1 = α . Similar to treatment 2, the 
return from the group account was determined by random number generation. 
The external risk treatments model decisions where, based on past events and 
statistical analysis, decision makers can estimate the possible outcomes and the probability of 
occurrence of these outcomes. For example, several studies have been undertaken to estimate 
the costs, health related benefits and associated probabilities of certain automobile emissions 
standards (e.g. clean fuels, banning lead additives, reduction of carbon monoxide and volatile 
organic compounds). Decisions in such case are usually based on known probabilities, i.e. in 
the face of “risk”. 
2.4.3.   External Uncertainty (Treatments 4 and 5) 
In treatments 4 and 5, the probability of receiving the return from the investment is drawn 
from a uniform distribution in each period and is not displayed to participants. Therefore, 
there is uncertainty regarding the return from the investment into the private (treatment 4) and 
the group (treatment 5) accounts. To learn the exact probability of return, participants must 
pay a fee of  20 = f  from their endowments. When participants choose to do so, the 
information regarding the probability of return from the private ( x p ) and group ( g p ) 
accounts is displayed on the computer screen in treatments 4 and 5, respectively. This 
information remains the private information of those participants that paid the fee for the 
information and they remain with  80 = − f i ω  tokens to invest in the period.  13
These treatments allow us to divide the participants into two distinct groups: those 
who know the exact value of the probability (facing risk) and those who do not (facing 
uncertainty). At the end of treatments 4 and 5 a questionnaire was filled out by the 
participants to assess their “willingness-to-pay” for the information regarding the probability 
of return from the private and the group account, respectively.  
Treatments 4 and 5 simulate scenarios when the probabilities of the environmental 
policy outcome are initially uncertain. Decision makers may invest in research in order to get 
estimates about the probabilities.
9 Research, however is costly, and will leave decision makers 
with less money to invest into mitigating the environmental problem itself. 
2.4.4.    Incentives (Treatments 6 and 7) 
In treatments 6 and 7, participants have the opportunity to increase the probability of return 
from the private and the group accounts, respectively. In treatment 6, participants face an 
uncertainty regarding the probability of return from the private account. Similarly to the 
previous treatments, the probability initially is drawn from a uniform distribution. 
Participants, however, due to their individual investments into the private account, could 
increase the probability of return from the private account. Similarly, in treatment 7 a higher 
level of aggregate investment into the group account may lead to the increase of the initial 
probability of return from the group account.  
The probability of return in each round is determined by the sum of a random number 
drawn from a uniform probability distribution and an increment due to the investment into the 
private (treatment 6) or the group account (treatment 7) in that round. That is, 
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ =
ω 2
1
i
xi
x
r p  and  ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
+ =
ω n
G
r pg 2
1 , respectively. 
                                                      
9 For example, scientists may use paleoclimatic data to analyze the relationship between world average 
surface temperatures and atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration. This analysis may be used to develop a 
probability that increased atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration will raise earth’s future temperature.  14
In treatment 6, therefore, depending on the individual investments, the participants 
may face differing levels of probabilities. Both the initial random number and the probability 
increment remain unknown to the participants until the end of the period. At the end of each 
period the computer displays the initial probability and the increase in probability of return 
from the private and the group account in treatment 6 and 7, respectively. 
The incentives treatments mainly reflect cases when technological advancement 
increases the probability of obtaining the benefits from the environmental project. For 
example, the problem of stratospheric ozone depletion caused by CFCs has been addressed 
effectively, in part, because of the development of substitute chemicals in response to the 
change in the regulations. A key to successful innovation is harnessing human ingenuity by 
international cooperation for the collective good. Treatment 7 models cases where 
innovations that have an impact on a global scale are involved. The reward for innovation and 
research and development in this paper is increased probability of obtaining the desired 
environmental outcome. 
In summary, in treatments 2 to 7 we vary external risk and uncertainty on the private 
and the group accounts while keeping the internal uncertainty and the expected payoff 
(together with the marginal incentives to contribute) equivalent to that in the Baseline 
treatment.   
2.5.   Hypotheses to be Tested 
Hypothesis 1: In payoff equivalent situations, subjects contribute less to the global good 
(group account) when risk or uncertainty is associated with the global good than when risk or 
uncertainty is associated with the local good (comparing treatment 2 with 3; and treatment 4 
with 5) 
Hypothesis 2: In payoff equivalent situations, subjects contribute less to the global good 
(group account) when they face endogenous probability of provision of the global good than  15
when they face endogenous probability of provision of the local good (private account) 
(comparing treatment 6 with 7) 
Hypothesis 3: In payoff equivalent situations, subjects’ contribution level to the local good 
(private account) is lower when facing uncertainty than when facing risk (comparing 
treatments 2 and 4) 
Hypothesis 4: In payoff equivalent situations, subjects’ contribution level to the global good 
(group account) is lower when facing uncertainty than when facing risk (comparing 
treatments 3 and 5) 
Hypothesis 5: In payoff equivalent situations, when probabilities are endogenous, i.e. subjects 
can increase the probability of provision of the local good (return from private account) 
subjects’ contribution to the local good will be higher than that when facing risk or 
uncertainty (comparing treatment 6 with 2 and 4) 
Hypothesis 6: In payoff equivalent situations, when probabilities are endogenous, i.e. subjects 
can increase the probability of provision of the global good (return from group account) 
subjects’ contribution to the global good will be higher than when  facing risk or uncertainty 
(comparing treatment 7 with 3 and 5). 
 
3.  Results 
We start with an overview of the data collected from the experiments, then report results from 
econometric tests which examine the impact of risk, uncertainty and incentives on individual 
behaviour. 
3.1. Overview 
Table 2 and Figure 1 present the average proportional contributions to the local and the 
global goods as a percentage of their endowments, for all treatments.
10 The dark parts of the 
                                                      
10 In the Uncertainty treatments (treatments 4 and 5), subjects may choose to pay a fee of 20 
experimental dollars from their endowment to reveal the probability associated with the local and the global  16
column illustrate the proportion of the endowment contributed to the global good. In all 
treatments except 2 and 4 the contribution to the global good is approximately 20 percent. In 
treatments 2 and 4, where there is risk or uncertainty associated with the local good, the 
average contribution towards the global good reaches approximately 50 percent. Subjects 
seem to move away from the risky or uncertain local good and contribute more towards the 
global good.  
Figure 2 tracks the average contributions to the global good over the 15 periods in 
each treatment and confirms the much higher contributions in treatments 2 and 4. 
Contributions start at a higher point and gradually taper down by the end of the session. 
Figure 3 depicts the deviation from the Baseline treatment. Since the baseline treatment 
(treatment 1) is a pure internal uncertainty treatment (there is no external uncertainty) and the 
internal uncertainty is kept constant throughout treatments 2-7, the deviation from the 
Baseline treatment could be considered to be solely the affect of the external risk and 
uncertainty. Except in treatment 2 and 4, when the risk and the uncertainty is related to the 
return from the local good, the contribution levels are below that in the Baseline treatment. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the decisions made by subjects under risk (i.e., known 
probability) versus uncertainty (i.e., unknown probability). The probability was revealed to 
those subjects who chose to pay a fee for it and thus they no longer face “uncertainty” but 
“risk”. Both Figures 4 and 5 show a difference in the pattern of the contribution levels to the 
global good when the probability of return from the local (treatment 4) and global goods 
(treatment 5) is known (subjects facing “risk”, marked by diamond shape) or unknown 
(subjects facing “uncertainty”, marked by rectangular shape). Subjects who face risk exhibit a 
negative relationship between contribution to the global good and the probability of return on 
the local good.. In contrast, those who make decisions in the face of uncertainty, tend not to 
                                                                                                                                                                     
good respectively. The proportional contribution takes account of the fact that in these two treatments some 
subjects have only 80 experimental dollars to place in the local and global account.    17
have any pattern in their behavior. The contributions levels seem to be randomly distributed. 
Similar to Figure 4, Figure 5 shows the average contributions for treatment 5, separated for 
risk and uncertainty. Comparing Figures 4 and 5, it is clear that the contributions to the global 
good are systematically lower in treatment 5. It is interesting to observe that there are a few 
subjects who were willing to pay for the information about the probability of return from the 
local or the global good in treatment 4 and 5, respectively but the information did not seem to 
play a role in their decisions. The investments displayed in the lower left (Figure 4) and the 
lower right (Figure 5) corners represent subjects who were willing to pay 20 experimental 
dollars for the information about the probability of return from the local or global good, 
respectively. However, even when the probability of return from the local good was very 
low ) 3 . 0 ( ≤ ≤ x p  or the probability of return from the global good was very high 
) 1 7 (. ≤ ≤ g p  these subjects invested either all or a substantial part of their remaining tokens 
into the local good. The interesting thing is not their investment decision, per se, but the fact 
that they were willing to pay for the information about the probabilities despite the fact this 
information did not seem to play a role in their decisions. Both cases may also be understood 
as a high aversion from the internal uncertainty. So even when external probabilities are 
unfavorable, they are still more attractive than internal uncertainty (i.e., contribution to the 
global good). 
3.2. Econometric Tests 
To examine whether our data support the six hypotheses outlined above, we present results 
from very conservative pairwise t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. These 
statistical tests use one observation per treatment per session. The non-parametric tests are 
particularly valuable as they require a minimum of statistical assumptions. In addition we 
also report results from multivariate regression models. These models evaluate the 
contribution of the (potential) impact of multiple influences on the decisions of subjects.  18
These panel regressions employ a random effects error structure, with the subject 
representing the random effect. We present results from random effects generalized least 
squares regressions where the dependent variable is the individual contributions made to the 
global good as a proportion of the endowment. We also present estimates from a random 
effects tobit model, as the dependent variable, being a proportion is censored and takes values 
between 0 and 1. Apart from the treatment dummy the other regressors included are: inverse 
of time period  ) (invperiod to capture the dynamic elements of the data ( t / 1 ), whether the 
random outcome was such that it resulted in the provision of the local or global good in the 
previous period: a binary variable (lout ), the difference between the amount contributed to 
the global good by an individual in the previous period  and the group contribution in the 
previous period (ldeviation ), the increase in  probability achieved in the previous period by 
the investments in treatment 6 and 7 (lprobincr), the expected marginal per capita ratio 
(EM ) and individual specific characteristics.
11 The individual characteristics are age, gender 
and their attitudes towards risk as captured by the lottery game conducted before the public 
goods experiment. From the results obtained from the lottery game, subjects could be 
classified into three categories: risk averse, risk neutral and risk lovers. This is an individual 
specific risk measure and allows us to control for their risk attitudes. We define dummies for 
risk averse and for risk neutral subjects and include these in the regression.
12 
Tables 4, 5A and 5B report results from pairwise regressions and Table 6 presents 
results from pooled regressions where we include the data for all the treatments and introduce 
treatment dummies (T2 to T7), with treatment 1 as the baseline dummy to examine how 
                                                      
11 The explanatory variables used to understand behavior vary depending on the treatments being 
considered. For example, lprobincr  is used only when comparing treatments 6 and 7, EM is used only in 
regressions comparing treatments 2 and 4 and treatments 3 and 5, in regressions where we separate the data for 
subjects who want to know the probability they face.   
12 Since subjects participated in the seven treatments in different order we conducted statistical tests to 
determine if the order in which they participated had an impact on contribution levels in the different treatments 
and found that the order had no behavioral implications.  19
subjects behave in the different treatments. In Table 6 we show results from different model 
specifications which are reported to indicate the robustness of the results.
13 The pooled results 
are consistent with the pairwise regressions reported.  
Results relating to the first two hypotheses are reported in Tables 3 and 4. These 
hypotheses examine the impact of the location of the risk and uncertainty, ie whether it is 
associated with the local or the global good. Both the statistical tests (t-tests and the 
Wilcoxon tests) and the regression results provide strong support for Hypothesis 1. The 
dummy for treatment (for treatment 3 in the regressions comparing treatments 2 and 3 and for 
treatment 5 in the regressions comparing treatments 4 and 5) is negative and statistically 
significant.
14  
Hypothesis 2 relating to the incentives treatments is not supported by the data. The 
point estimates show that the average contributions to the global good are higher in treatment 
7 than in treatment 6, although the difference is not statistically significant. The regression 
results however show that the contributions to the global good are significantly higher in 
treatment 7.  This is the only treatment in which even though subjects face uncertainty in the 
global good, they contribute about the same as they do when they face uncertainty in the local 
good (treatment 6). The subjects in this treatment perhaps think that they can make a 
difference by contributing more to the global good and increasing the probability of return. 
They think that they have some control over the uncertainty. Hence when there is an 
opportunity to benefit from common international innovations and technology improvement, 
                                                      
13 Model 1 in Table 6 includes only time and the treatment dummies, Model 2 adds lagged variables 
(lout,  ldeviation) and Model 3 adds the individual specific characteristics. The results are robust to these 
additions. We also conducted these robustness tests for the pairwise regressions reported in Tables 4 and 5A and 
5B, but do not present them in the paper to conserve space. Again the results are robust to different model 
specifications.  
14 In additional regressions we only include the subjects who paid a fee to reveal the probability they 
were facing in treatments 4 and 5, since subjects who learnt the probabilities associated with the local (treatment 
4) and the global good (treatment 5) behave systematically different from those who are unaware of such 
information. The results for these are presented in Table 6 (Model 4). The dummy for treatment 5 is negative 
though not significant in this sub sample. 
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it could act as an incentive to deal with global environmental problems like climate change. 
So the fact that the international cooperation will bring amplified benefit to the participants 
could increase the willingness to contribute to the solution of the global environmental 
problem. 
Results associated with Hypotheses 3-6, which examine whether individuals behave 
differently when they face risk, uncertainty or can change the probability they face, are 
presented in Tables 3, 5A and 5B. Hypothesis 3 is not supported by the tests and the 
regression results (dummy for treatment 4 is negative and significant and not positive as the 
hypothesis would suggest.). This could be evidence of positive optimism or wishful thinking. 
In treatment 2 subjects know that they have only 50% chance of obtaining the local good.  In 
treatment 4 subjects face uncertainty on the local good and in this case they could put more 
weight on the high end of the distribution. Subjects seem to interpret uncertainty in a way to 
justify their increased contribution to the local good and consequently deceased contribution 
to the global good. These results also corroborate with Rapoport et al. (1992) and Suleiman et 
al. (1996) who showed in a common pool resource game context that with increased level of 
environmental uncertainty the resource request from the common pool resource increased. It 
seems that when subjects estimate the probabilities, they have the tendency to over or under 
estimate it depending on what they hope for.
15 
The regression results support Hypothesis 4. The dummy for treatment 5 is negative 
and significant, indicating the contributions to the global good are lower when subjects face 
uncertainty as compared to risk. The point estimates for the statistical tests also support this 
hypothesis however the difference is not statistically significant. Here as the uncertainty is 
associated with the global good, subjects perhaps perceive the probabilities differently, 
                                                      
15 In Table 5A we also present results from regressions where we include only individuals who pay to 
know the probability in treatment 4 and compare to behavior in treatment 2. The dummy for treatment 4 retains 
its negative and significant pattern.   21
expecting it to be near the low end of the distribution. Separating the data for subjects who 
want to know in treatment 5 (Table 5A columns 6 and 7), we find that for subjects who 
choose to convert uncertainty into risk, the contributions are not lower in treatment 5. These 
subjects paid a fee to know the probability so they are perhaps the subjects who would be 
more aware about contributions to the global good relative to those who did not even pay the 
fee. This may explain the statistically significant increase in contribution levels relative to 
treatment 3 (according to the GLS estimate). Essentially, however, for subjects who chose to 
know the probability, treatments 3 and 5 are the same so the contribution levels for these 
subjects should be the same (and this is confirmed by the tobit estimates). This gives 
additional support for hypothesis 4, as it indicates that it is uncertainty that is driving 
contributions to be lower in treatment 5 as compared to treatment 3. 
We obtain strong support for Hypothesis 5. Both the statistical tests and the 
regressions (Table 5B) show that contributions to the global good in treatment 6 are 
significantly lower than in treatments 2 or 4. In treatment 6 subjects can increase the 
probability of return they face if they invest more in the local good. This incentive crowds out 
the contribution to the global good.  
Hypothesis 6 is supported by the regression results (Table 5B), which show that 
contributions in treatment 7 are significantly higher than contributions in treatments 3 and 5. 
The point estimates confirm this however the differences in contributions are not statistically 
significant using the t-tests and wilcoxon tests.   
Other regressors: The results from the multivariate regressions show that the time 
variable is positive and highly significant implying that contributions to the global good 
decay over time.
16 The variable which measures whether the good was provided in the 
                                                      
16 The specification of this variable captures the non-linearity in the data. Figure 2 indicates that 
contributions have a non-linear pattern with a sharper drop in the early periods and a more gradual decline in the  22
previous period (lout ) is positive and significant in some regressions, indicating that a 
provision of the good in the previous period increases the contribution to the global good in 
the current period.
17 Deviation  ) (ldeviation  which captures the difference between the 
individual and group contribution in the previous period is very substantial in explaining 
contributions, with a higher level of deviation leading to higher contributions in this period. 
This result is appealing intuitively since it suggests that people use feedback from other 
members of the group when deciding future contribution levels. The feedback is used by the 
subjects as information about the internal uncertainty and such information seems to guide 
subjects in their decision. These results are consistent with Dickinson (1998) who also finds 
that the deviation of a person’s contributions in the previous round from the group affects 
individual contributions. Furthermore, they confirm Festinger’s (1954) conjecture that the 
more uncertain people are in their knowledge about the task, the more likely it is that they 
will try to reduce their uncertainty via information on how others respond. In sum, 
information on fellow group members' cooperation seems to serve as a means of how to deal 
with the uncertainty. The variable lprobincr: which captures the impact of the lag of the 
increase in probability in the provision of the good, shows that as the probability in the 
previous period increases, the contributions increase in this period. The variable, EM  is 
positive and highly significant in explaining contributions.
18 This result corroborates previous 
findings (e.g. Dickinson, 1998) and suggests that even when the dominant strategy of Nash 
equilibrium of zero contribution is maintained, higher marginal incentives, per se, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
later period for most treatments, hence this particular specification was used to highlight the time element of the 
contributions. 
17 This variable however does not have a consistent pattern across regressions. 
18 Several studies (for example, Isaac et al., 1984 and Kim and Walker, 1984) have investigated the 
importance of marginal incentives (EM ) on contribution levels. In the results reported in the paper, we include 
EM as an explanatory variable in regressions where we only have data on individuals who want to know the 
probability they face.     23
significantly increased contribution levels. Individual level characteristics like age, gender 
and risk behavior of the subject do not provide a consistent pattern of behaviour.
19  
 
4. Conclusions 
We use laboratory experiments and a standard public goods game to examine the decisions of 
subjects when facing both internal (strategic) and external (environmental) risks and 
uncertainties. We keep the internal uncertainty constant throughout the seven treatments and 
introduce different forms of risk and uncertainty regarding the provision of local and global 
environmental goods. We find that even in a payoff equivalent situation, external risk and 
uncertainty associated with both local and global environmental problems act as a significant 
factor when making decisions, with subjects moving away from the external uncertainty or 
risk. The location of the external risk or uncertainty matters, with subjects moving away from 
the external uncertainty in favor of internal uncertainty, when that uncertainty relates to the 
local good. When it relates to the global good, then subjects face internal and external 
uncertainty on the same good leading to a complete collapse of the contributions towards this 
good. These results are in line with the observation of Wit and Wilke (1998) who found a 
dramatic drop in the contribution levels when high external variability was coupled with 
internal uncertainty. Our results also confirm the observation in Rapoport et al. (1992) and 
Suleiman et al. (1996) that when subjects had to interpret different forms of uncertainty they 
had a tendency to bias their estimates by what they hoped for (“wishful thinking”). 
                                                      
19 These individual specific variables are sometimes significant in the tobit regressions. Risk behavior 
matters, with risk averse subjects (74% of our sample) contributing less and risk neutral subjects (10% of our 
sample) contributing significantly more than risk loving subjects (16% of our sample). It seems that risk neutral 
subjects see the underlying payoff equivalence between the treatments and they also see that regardless of the 
risk associated with the returns, the underlying problem is a public goods game with Pareto efficient 
contribution levels of 100%. Risk averse subject, however, divert away from not only the external risk and 
uncertainty but also from the internal uncertainty associated with contributing to the global good.  24
The long period between when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated in 1997 and its 
final entry into force in 2005 has been compared unfavorably with the rapid formal 
recognition and overwhelming success of the Montreal Protocol  which banned CFCs, 
primarily responsible for depletion of the ozone layer. While both negotiations involved 
strategic uncertainty, the two global environmental problems differed in the degree of 
knowledge about the environmental uncertainties. While climate change is undoubtedly a 
case of “uncertainty” (treatment 5), the ozone layer depletion is more characterized as “risk” 
(treatment 3). This paper explains the difference in the success of the environmental 
negotiations by the results that when internal (strategic) uncertainty is coupled with external 
(environmental) uncertainty, the contribution levels are close to zero, and this is more so 
when individuals face external uncertainty as compared to external risk. Our results suggest 
that it was not the internal uncertainty, per se, but the presence of the external uncertainty that 
led to the long period of negotiations on climate change. 
In the Incentives (endogenous probability of provision) treatment, subjects contribute 
more than they do in the other treatments, i.e. when given a chance to reduce the uncertainty 
relating to the global environmental good subjects contribute more (comparing treatments 5 
and 7 and treatments 7 and 3). This relates to the role of innovation in determining 
environmental outcomes. The reward for research and development and innovation is 
captured here by the increased probability of obtaining the desired environmental outcome in 
the endogenous probability treatment. Subjects seem to understand this incentive and 
contribute more towards global goods in this treatment.  
Subjects are willing to pay a fee to reveal the uncertainty in treatments where the 
uncertainty relates to a local good rather than a global good. Interestingly, we find that some 
subjects are willing to pay to avoid uncertainty (unknown probabilities) in favor of risk 
(known probabilities) even if such probabilities play little role in their decision making. This  25
may explain the ambivalent behavior of governments of being committed to financing 
research on environmental problems, yet placing little importance on the scientific results 
when having to make decisions. (The climate change research and US and Australian 
governments are good examples.) We also find that information on fellow group members' 
cooperation seems to serve as a norm of how to deal with uncertainty. This indicates that 
transparency of international environmental negotiations could serve as an important factor in 
the success of the negotiations, since participants use the contributions of other group 
members as yardstick when facing internal (strategic) and external (environmental) 
uncertainty. 
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33.  Tables 
Table 1. Treatment parameterization 
Treatment  α   β   x p   g p  
Baseline 1  1 1.5  1  Known  1  Known 
2  2 1.5  0.5  Known  1  Known 
Risk 
3  1 3  1  Known  0.5  Known 
4  2 1.5 
x x r p =  
uniform 
distribution 
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ x r  
Unknown, 
unless 
requested 
1 Known 
Uncertainty 
5  1 3  1  Known 
r pg =  
uniform 
distribution 
) 1 , 0 ( ∈ g r  
Unknown, 
unless 
requested 
6  2 1.5  ) ( i x xi x f r p + =  
 
Unknown 1 Known 
Incentives 
7  1 3  1  Known  ) (G f r p g g + =   Unknown 
 
Table 2.Total and mean investment into the private and the group accounts 
  Investment into the 
Treatment Private  Account  Group  Account 
 Total  Mean  Total  Mean 
St Dev 
(Private and Group 
Accounts) 
1  56539 75.39  18461  24.61  32.66 
2  36449 48.60  38551  51.40  38.26 
3  65664 87.55  9336  12.45  21.74 
4  41230 54.97  33770  45.03  41.90 
5  67269 89.69  7731  10.31  22.89 
6  63928 85.24  11072  14.76  26.07 
7  62976 83.97  12024  16.03  28.31 
Total  394055 75.06  130945  24.94   
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Table 3. Pairwise t-tests and non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum tests for the difference in means 
Treatment  1 2 3 4 5 6 
2  3.379*** 
2.721***       
3  -1.873* 
-1.739* 
-5.790*** 
-3.628***      
4  2.899*** 
2.343*** 
-0.879 
-0.983 
5.758*** 
3.780***     
5  -2.237** 
-2.192** 
-6.197*** 
-3.704*** 
-0.443 
-0.302 
-6.265*** 
-3.780***    
6  -1.540 
-1.285 
-5.521*** 
-3.704*** 
0.478 
0.680 
-5.454*** 
-3.628*** 
0.947 
0.983   
7  -1.140 
-1.361 
-4.562*** 
-3.099*** 
0.570 
0.151 
-4.236*** 
-2.948*** 
0.926 
0.756 
0.205 
-0.151 
 
Notes: The pairwise estimates use the horizontal as the comparison base. The first number 
reported in each cell is the t-statistic and the second number reported is the z-statistic from the 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test. *: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: 
Significant at the 1% level.  
Table 4. Random Effects GLS and Tobit estimates for the individual contribution levels: 
Pairwise Regressions, Testing Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
  Treatment 2 & 3  Treatment 4 & 5  Treatment 6 & 7 
  GLS Tobit GLS Tobit GLS Tobit 
Invperiod  0.4607*** 0.7925*** 0.2654*** 0.6170*** 0.3204*** 0.9573*** 
  (0.0527) (0.0937) (0.0646) (0.1501) (0.0416) (0.1061) 
Treatment  -0.3883*** -0.6099*** -0.3412*** -0.7204***  0.0307**  0.0950*** 
  (0.0125) (0.0237) (0.0153) (0.0400) (0.0122) (0.0308) 
Lout 0.0425***  0.0721***  0.0053  0.0115  -0.0118  0.0004 
  (0.0126) (0.0227) (0.0154) (0.0370) (0.0106) (0.0310) 
Ldeviation  0.0047*** 0.0063*** 0.0038*** 0.0056*** 0.0044*** 0.0068*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0009) (0.0003) (0.0008) 
Sex  -0.0002 0.1405*** 0.0277  -0.0984*  0.0246 0.3699*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0269) (0.0304) (0.0587) (0.0305) (0.0542) 
Age -0.0001  -0.0054**  0.0029  0.0013  0.0102***  0.0152*** 
  (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0041) (0.0028) (0.0042) 
Risk_av 0.0166  -0.1030***  0.0166  0.0930  -0.0347  -0.0432 
  (0.0459) (0.0372) (0.0409) (0.0733) (0.0410) (0.0568) 
Risk_neutral 0.0432  0.0580  0.1506**  0.5188*** 0.0724  0.1082 
  (0.0681) (0.0495) (0.0606) (0.0914) (0.0607) (0.0662) 
Lprobincr       0.0024***  0.0060*** 
       (0.0007)  (0.0020) 
Constant 0.3944***  0.4143***  0.2868***  -0.0355  -0.1629**  -0.9051*** 
  (0.0826) (0.0631) (0.0744) (0.1130) (0.0745) (0.1956) 
Observations  1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 1400 
Number of 
group(session 
subject) 
50 50 50 50 50 50 
χ
2  1316.68  919.38 639.39 404.32 353.69 353.29 
Prob > χ
2   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Notes: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. 
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level.  30
Table 5A.  Random Effects GLS and Tobit estimates for the individual contribution levels: 
Pairwise Regressions, Testing Hypotheses 3 and 4. 
 
Treatment 2 & 4
#  Treatment 3 & 5 
 
 
GLS Tobit GLS  GLS Tobit GLS Tobit 
Invperiod  0.5059*** 0.8869*** 0.4568*** 0.2344*** 0.5461*** 0.2890*** 0.5739*** 
  (0.0704) (0.1324) (0.0756) (0.0375) (0.0841) (0.0468) (0.0896) 
Treatment -0.0665***  -0.1132***  -0.1633***  -0.0225**  -0.0826***  0.1062***  0.0304 
  (0.0167) (0.0318) (0.0224) (0.0089) (0.0210) (0.0220) (0.0420) 
Lout  0.0671***  0.1378*** 0.0618*** -0.0203**  -0.0690*** -0.0209*  -0.0512** 
  (0.0168) (0.0319) (0.0178) (0.0090) (0.0212) (0.0117) (0.0236) 
Ldeviation  0.0029*** 0.0045*** 0.0026*** 0.0034*** 0.0044*** 0.0035*** 0.0039*** 
  (0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0004) (0.0006) 
Sex 0.0226  -0.0684*  0.0153  0.0077  0.0351  -0.0064  0.0942** 
  (0.0443) (0.0398) (0.0477) (0.0209) (0.0251) (0.0242) (0.0426) 
Age  0.0035 0.0100*** 0.0002  0.0003 -0.0044** 0.0010  -0.0047* 
  (0.0041) (0.0034) (0.0045) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0025) 
Risk_av 0.0590  0.0319  0.0683  -0.0219  -0.0339  -0.0287  0.0649 
  (0.0596) (0.0544) (0.0638) (0.0281) (0.0359) (0.0327) (0.0473) 
Risk_neutral 0.1211  0.2959***  0.1004  0.0841**  0.0908**  0.0499  0.0680 
  (0.0883) (0.0721) (0.0944) (0.0417) (0.0445) (0.0479) (0.0444) 
EM     0.7325***      1.7056***  2.6959*** 
     (0.0393)    (0.1085)  (0.2248) 
Constant  0.2450**  -0.1525 0.1080 0.0896*  -0.1838***  -0.4336***  -1.0548*** 
  (0.1074) (0.0971) (0.1167) (0.0508) (0.0609) (0.0668) (0.0999) 
Observations 1400  1400  986  1400  1400  771  771 
χ
2  159.54  166.18  447.56 174.11 133.51 440.35 254.31 
Prob > χ
2   (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Notes: 
#: We could not run the Random Effects Tobit regression because of convergence problems.   
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level. Numbers in 
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Table 5B. Random Effects GLS and Tobit estimates for the individual contribution levels: 
Pairwise Regressions, Testing Hypotheses 5 and 6. 
 
Treatment 2 & 6  Treatment 
4 & 6
# 
Treatment 3 & 7  Treatment 5 & 7   
GLS Tobit GLS GLS  Tobit  GLS Tobit 
Invperiod  0.4477*** 0.9322*** 0.3682***  0.3445***  0.7706***  0.2299*** 0.6789*** 
  (0.0559) (0.1093) (0.0630)  (0.0379)  (0.0854)  (0.0391) (0.0983) 
Treatment  -0.3769*** -0.7049*** -0.3040*** 0.0260***  -0.0014  0.0481***  0.0830*** 
  (0.0134) (0.0296) (0.0153)  (0.0090)  (0.0214)  (0.0092) (0.0248) 
Lout 0.0404***  0.0830***  0.0140  -0.0045  0.0035  -0.0138  -0.0154 
  (0.0139) (0.0278) (0.0156)  (0.0092)  (0.0218)  (0.0094) (0.0251) 
Ldeviation  0.0043*** 0.0069*** 0.0034***  0.0037***  0.0045***  0.0025*** 0.0038*** 
  (0.0003) (0.0006) (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0006)  (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Sex  0.0314 -0.0002 0.0492  -0.0069  -0.1457***  -0.0002 -0.0137 
  (0.0327) (0.0543) (0.0319)  (0.0318)  (0.0328)  (0.0355) (0.0368) 
Age  0.0057* 0.0211***  0.0103*** 0.0045  0.0184*** 0.0038  0.0002 
  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)  (0.0030)  (0.0023)  (0.0033) (0.0023) 
Risk_av 0.0310  0.1940***  0.0322  -0.0523  0.0429  -0.0457  0.2881*** 
  (0.0440) (0.0596) (0.0429)  (0.0427)  (0.0361)  (0.0477) (0.0542) 
Risk_neutral  0.0408 0.0069 0.1016  0.0794 0.1439*** 0.1296* 0.2084*** 
  (0.0652) (0.0877) (0.0636)  (0.0633)  (0.0506)  (0.0707) (0.0528) 
Constant 0.2437***  -0.4194***  0.0827  -0.0029  -0.6576***  0.0016  -0.4541*** 
  (0.0794) (0.0884) (0.0782)  (0.0765)  (0.0695)  (0.0854) (0.0716) 
Observations  1400 1400 1400  1400  1400  1400 1400 
χ
2  1073.77 773.19  568.92 264.76  265.26 139.65  142.45 
Prob> χ
2  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Notes: 
#: We could not run the Random Effects Tobit regression because of convergence problems.  
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level.  
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  32
Table 6. Random Effects GLS and Tobit estimates for the individual contribution levels: Pooled 
Regressions 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variables  GLS Tobit GLS Tobit GLS Tobit GLS Tobit 
0.226*** 0.490*** 0.369*** 0.811*** 0.369*** 0.808***  0.003  0.140  Invperiod 
(0.016) (0.033) (0.030) (0.065) (0.030) (0.065) (0.128) (0.290) 
0.267*** 0.438*** 0.279*** 0.435*** 0.279*** 0.440***      T2 
(0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029)    
-0.122*** -0.251*** -0.108*** -0.209*** -0.108*** -0.208***      T3 
(0.014) (0.031) (0.014) (0.031) (0.014) (0.031)    
0.204*** 0.335*** 0.211*** 0.332*** 0.211*** 0.335***      T4 
(0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029) (0.014) (0.029)    
-0.143*** -0.356*** -0.131*** -0.312*** -0.131*** -0.308***  -0.043  -0.025  T5 
(0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.032) (0.044) (0.097) 
-0.099*** -0.274*** -0.093*** -0.275*** -0.093*** -0.271***      T6 
(0.014) (0.032) (0.013) (0.031) (0.013) (0.031)    
-0.086*** -0.246*** -0.081*** -0.233*** -0.081*** -0.228***      T7 
(0.014) (0.032) (0.014) (0.031) (0.014) (0.031)    
    0.017** 0.040** 0.016** 0.044**  -0.038  -0.075  Lout 
   (0.008)  (0.017) (0.008) (0.018) (0.031) (0.069) 
    0.004*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.007***  0.000  0.002  Ldeviation 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
     0.006  0.070*  0.038  0.083  Sex 
     (0.029)  (0.020) (0.064) (0.153) 
     0.004  -0.003*  -0.005  -0.009  Age 
     (0.003)  (0.005) (0.008) (0.017) 
     -0.008  0.005  0.078  0.154  Risk_av 
     (0.040)  (0.025) (0.082) (0.199) 
     0.092  0.167**  0.155  0.325  Risk_neutral 
     (0.059)  (0.032) (0.108) (0.231) 
       0.773***  1.852***  EM 
       ( 0 . 0 4 0 )   ( 0 . 1 3 5 )  
0.196*** -0.220*** 0.156*** -0.101*** 0.057***  0.275  0.121  -0.429  Constant 
0.023 (0.030)  (0.019)  (0.030) (0.072) (0.053) (0.189) (0.408) 
1933.99 1359.94 2748.52  184.60  2757.27 1752.41  394.50  191.69  χ
2 
Prob > χ
2   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: For Model 3, Tobit: Pairwise tests within pooled regressions: Test T2=T3, χ
2 (1)= 491.76 ***; Test T4=T5, χ
2 (1)= 
444.49 ***; Test T6=T7, χ
2 (1)= 1.84; Test T2=T4, χ
2 (1)= 14.61 ***; Test T3=T5, χ
2 (1)= 10.08 ***; Test T2=T6, χ
2 (1)= 
543.66 ***; Test T4=T6, χ
2 (1)= 392.08 ***; Test T3=T7, χ
2 (1)= 0.39; Test T5=T7, χ
2 (1)= 6.33 ***;  
*: Significant at the 10% level; **: Significant at the 5% level; ***: Significant at the 1% level. Numbers in parentheses are 
standard errors.  33
Figures 
Figure 1. Proportional Contribution into the Private and the Group Accounts 
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Figure 2. Average Contribution Levels over the Fifteen Periods 
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Figure 3. Average Contribution Levels Relative to the Baseline Treatment 
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Figure 4. Investment into the Group Account in External Risk and Uncertainty (Treatment 4) 
Risk vs. Uncertainty
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Figure 5. Investment into the Group Account in External Risk and Uncertainty (Treatment 5) 
Risk vs. Uncertainty
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